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Abstract
Deep neural networks, while generalize well, are
known to be sensitive to small adversarial pertur-
bations. This phenomenon poses severe security
threat and calls for in-depth investigation of the
robustness of deep learning models. With the
emergence of neural networks for graph struc-
tured data, similar investigations are urged to un-
derstand their robustness. It has been found that
adversarially perturbing the graph structure and/or
node features may result in a significant degrada-
tion of the model performance. In this work, we
show from a different angle that such fragility sim-
ilarly occurs if the graph contains a few bad-actor
nodes, which compromise a trained graph neu-
ral network through flipping the connections to
any targeted victim. Worse, the bad actors found
for one graph model severely compromise other
models as well. We call the bad actors “anchor
nodes” and propose an algorithm, named GUA,
to identify them. Thorough empirical investiga-
tions suggest an interesting finding that the anchor
nodes often belong to the same class; and they
also corroborate the intuitive trade-off between
the number of anchor nodes and the attack success
rate. For the data set Cora which contains 2708
nodes, as few as six anchor nodes will result in an
attack success rate higher than 80% for GCN and
other three models.
1. Introduction
Graph structured data are ubiquitous with examples ranging
from proteins, power grids, traffic networks, to social net-
works. Deep learning models for graphs, in particular, graph
neural networks (GNN) (Scarselli et al., 2008; Bruna et al.,
2014; Duvenaud et al., 2015; Defferrard et al., 2016; Li et al.,
2016; Gilmer et al., 2017; Kipf & Welling, 2017; Hamilton
et al., 2017; Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017) attracted much attention
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recently and have achieved remarkable success in several
tasks, including community detection, link prediction, and
node classification. Their success is witnessed by many
practical applications, such as content recommendation (Wu
et al., 2019b), protein interaction (Tsubaki et al., 2018), and
blog analysis (Conover et al., 2011).
Deep learning models are known to be vulnerable and may
suffer intentional attack with unnoticeable change of the
data (Zu¨gner et al., 2018). This observation originated from
early findings by Szegedy et al. (2014) and Goodfellow et al.
(2014), who show that images perturbed with adversarially
designed noise can be misclassified, while the perturbation
is almost imperceptible. This minor but intentional change
would result in severe consequences socially and econom-
ically. For example, Wikipedia hoaxes lead to disinforma-
tion (Kumar et al., 2016). Different from real articles that
link to each other coherently, hoax articles usually have few
and random connections to real articles. These hoax articles
can effectively disguise through modifying their links in a
proper manner. For another example, some credit prediction
models are based in part on social networks. Bad guys may
hide themselves through building plausible friendship that
confuses the prediction system.
In this work, we study the vulnerability of GNNs and show
that it is indeed possible to attack them if a few graph nodes
serve as the bad actors: when their links to a certain node
are flipped, the node will likely be misclassified. Such
attacks are akin to universal attacks because the bad actors
are universal to any targeted node. We propose a graph
universal adversarial attack method, GUA, to identify the
bad actors.
Our work differs from recent studies on adversarial attack
and defense of GNNs (Dai et al., 2018; Zu¨gner et al., 2018;
Jin et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2019) in the attack setting. Prior
work focus on poisoning attacks (injecting or modifying
training data as well as labels to foster a misbehaving model)
and evasion attacks (modifying test data to encourage mis-
classification of a trained model). For graphs, these attacks
could modify the graph structure and/or node features in
a target-dependent scenario. The setting we consider, on
the other hand, is a single and universal modification that
applies to all targets. One clear advantage from the attack
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Figure 1. Illustration of GUA. A small number of anchor nodes (4, 5, and 7) is identified. To confuse the classification of a target node
(e.g., 2), their connections to this node are flipped.
point of view is that computing the modification incurs a
lower cost, as it is done once for all. More advantages will
be elaborated later.
While universal attacks were studied earlier (see, e.g.,
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017) who compute a single pertur-
bation applied to all images in the data set), graph universal
attacks are rarely explored. This work contributes to the
literature a setting and a method that may inspire further
study on defense mechanisms of deep graph models.
Figure 1 illustrates the universal attack setting we consider.
A few bad-actor nodes (4, 5, and 7) are identified; we call
them anchor nodes. When an adversary attempts to attack
the classification of a target node (say, 2), the existing links
from the anchor nodes to the target node are removed while
non-existing links are created. The identification method we
propose, GUA, is conducted on a particular classification
model (here, GCN), but the found anchors apply to other
models as well (e.g., DeepWalk, node2vec, and GAT).
As a type of attacks, universal attacks may be preferred by
the adversary for several reasons. First, the anchor nodes
are computed only once and there incurs no extra cost when
attacking individual targets. Second, the number of anchors
can be very small (it is easier to compromise fewer nodes).
Third, attacks are less noticeable when only a limited num-
ber of links are flipped.
The contribution of this work is fourfold:
1. We present a novel attack setting for graph structured
data, which calls for vigilance when applying graph
deep learning models, as well as defense mechanisms
to counter such attacks.
2. We propose a novel algorithm for graph universal at-
tack that achieves high success rate and demonstrates
vulnerability of graph deep learning models.
3. We demonstrate appealing generalization of the attack
algorithm, which finds anchor nodes based on a small
training set but successfully attacks a majority of the
targets in the graph.
4. We show attractive transferability of the found anchors
(based on GCN) through demonstrating similar attack
success rates on other graph deep learning models.
2. Notation and Background
A graph is denoted as G = (V,E), where V is the node set
and E is the edge set. An unweighted graph is represented
by the adjacency matrix A = {0, 1}|V |×|V |; a weighted
graph replaces the binary values ofA by real-valued weights.
For undirected graphs A is symmetric. In this work we con-
sider unweighted and undirected graphs. The graph nodes
may be accompanied by d-dimensional features, which col-
lectively form the feature matrix X , whose dimension is
|V | × d.
More sophisticated feature representations (called embed-
dings) may be obtained in an unsupervised manner; see
e.g., DeepWalk (Perozzi et al., 2014), node2vec (Grover &
Leskovec, 2016), and LINE (Tang et al., 2015). Recently,
graph neural networks (Scarselli et al., 2008; Bruna et al.,
2014; Duvenaud et al., 2015; Defferrard et al., 2016; Li et al.,
2016; Gilmer et al., 2017; Kipf & Welling, 2017; Hamilton
et al., 2017; Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017) emerge as a supervised
approach for obtaining node embeddings and performing
predictions simultaneously. In this work we use GCN (Kipf
& Welling, 2017) as an attack example.
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Figure 2. An example of attacking the third node in a five-node graph with the universal attack matrix P .
In GCN, one normalizes the adjacency matrix into Â =
D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 , where A˜ = A + I and D˜ is the diagonal ad-
justed degree matrix with diagonal entries D˜ii =
∑|V |
j=1 A˜ij .
Then, the neural network is
Z = f(A,X) = softmax(Aˆσ(AˆXW (0))W (1)), (1)
where σ denotes an activation function and W (0) and W (1)
are model parameters. The training of the parameters uses
the cross-entropy loss. Let VL be the set of training nodes
and Y be the one-hot label matrix. Then, with C classes,
the loss function is
L = −
∑
v∈VL
C∑
c=1
Yvc lnZvc. (2)
3. Graph Universal Adversarial Attack
Following the notation introduced in the preceding section,
given the graph adjacency matrix A and node feature ma-
trix X , we let f(A,X) be the classification model and let
lˆ(A,X, i) be the predicted label of node i; that is,
lˆ(A,X, i) = arg max f(A,X)i. (3)
Given a trained model f , the goal is for each node i to
modify the adjacency matrix A into A′ such that
lˆ(A′, X, i) 6= lˆ(A,X, i). (4)
Note that the modified A′ is i-dependent in our attack set-
ting.
3.1. Attack Vector and Matrix
Let the graph have n nodes. We use a length-n binary
vector p to denote the attack vector to be determined, where
1 means an anchor node and 0 otherwise. Hence, A′ is a
function of three quantities: the original adjacency matrix
A, the target node i, and the attack vector p.
To derive an explicit form of the function, we extend the vec-
tor p to an n×nmatrix P , whose ith row and ith column are
the same as p and zero elsewhere. Thus, the (i, j) element
of the attack matrix P indicates whether the connection of
the node pair (i, j) is flipped: 1 means yes and 0 means no.
It is then not hard to see that one may write the function as
A′ := g(A, i, p) = (1− P ) ◦A+ P ◦ (10 −A), e (5)
where 1 denotes the matrix of all ones and 10 is similar
except that the diagonal is replaced by zero. The term
(1−P ) serves as the mask that preserves the connections of
all node pairs other than those between the anchors j and the
target node i. The term (10 −A) intends to flip the whole
A (except diagonal) but the P in the front ensures that only
the involved (i, j) pairs are actually flipped. Moreover, one
can verify that the diagonal of the new adjacency matrix
remains zero.
Figure 2 shows an example for a graph with n = 5 nodes.
Node i = 3 is being attacked. The attack vector p =
[1, 0, 1, 0, 1] (that is, the anchor nodes are 1, 3, and 5). The
connection between 1 and 3 is flipped from 0 (non-edge) to
1 (edge).
The binary elements of the attack vector p may be relaxed
into real values between 0 and 1. In this case, the connec-
tions of all node pairs other than those between the anchors
j and the target node i remain the same. On the other hand,
the connections between the involved (i, j) pairs are frac-
tionally changed. The jth element of p indicates the strength
of change. The relaxation opens opportunity for gradient
based optimization.
3.2. Outer Procedure: GUA
Recall that VL is the training set with known node labels.
Given an attack success rate threshold δ, we formulate the
problem as finding a binary vector p such that
Err(VL) :=
1
|VL|
|VL|∑
i=1
1lˆ(A′,X,i) 6=lˆ(A,X,i) ≥ δ. (6)
To effectively leverage gradient-based tools for adversarial
attacks, we perform a continuous relaxation on p so that
it can be iteratively updated. Now elements of p stay in
the interval [0, 1]. The algorithm proceeds as follows. We
initialize p with zero. In each epoch, we begin with a binary
p and iteratively visit each training node i. If i is not mis-
classified by the current p, we seek a minimum continuous
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perturbation ∆p to misclassify it. In other words,
∆p = arg min
r
||r||2
s.t. lˆ(g(A, i, p+ r), X, i) 6= lˆ(A,X, i).
(7)
We will elaborate in the next subsection an algorithm to find
such ∆p. After all training nodes are visited, we perform
a hard threasholding at 0.5 and force back p to be a binary
vector. Then, the next epoch begins. We run a maximum
number of epochs and terminate when (6) is satisfied.
The updated p ← p + ∆p found through solving (7), if
unbounded, may be problematic because (i) it may incur
too many anchor nodes and (ii) its elements may be outside
[0, 1]. We perform an L2-norm projection to circumvent the
first problem and a clipping to circumvent the second. The
rationale ofL2-norm projection is to suppress the magnitude
of p and encourage that eventually few entries are greater
than 0.5. As can be seen from Figure 3, the number of
anchor nodes grows quadratically with the projection radius
ξ. A small ξ clearly encourages fewer anchors.
Figure 3. Relationship between the projection radius ξ and the
maximum number of possible anchors.
Through experimentation, we find that clipping is crucial to
obtaining a stable result. In a later section, we illustrate an
experiment to show that the attack success rate may drop to
zero in several random trials, if clipping is not performed.
See Figure 5.
The procedure presented so far is summarized in Algo-
rithm 1. The algorithm for obtaining ∆p is called IMP
(iterative minimum perturbation) and will be discussed next.
3.3. Inner Procedure: IMP
To solve (7), we adapt DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016) to find a minimum perturbation that sends the target
node i to the decision boundary of another class.
Denote by v be the minimum perturbation. See Figure 4.
To find the closest decision boundary other than that of the
Algorithm 1 Graph Universal Attack (GUA)
Input: max epoch, max iter, δ
p← 0
while Err(VL) < δ and epoch < max epoch do
for i ∈ VL do
A′ ← g(A, i, p)
if lˆ(A′, X, i) = lˆ(A,X, i) then
∆p, iter ← IMP(A′, i)
if iter < max iter then
p← p+ ∆p
p← L2-norm projection(p)
p← p.clip(0, 1)
end if
end if
end for
p← (p > 0.5) ? 1 : 0
compute Err(VL)
epoch← epoch+ 1
end while
return p
original class pred = lˆ(A,X, i), we first select the closest
class k:
k = arg min
c6=pred
|∆fc|
‖∆wc‖2 , (8)
where ∆fc = f(A,X)i,c − f(A,X)i,pred and ∆wc =
∇f(A,X)i,c − ∇f(A,X)i,pred. Then, we update v by
adding to it ∆v:
∆v =
|∆fk|
||∆wk||22
∆wk. (9)
We iteratively update v until (1 + overshoot)× v success-
fully attack node i, where overshoot is a small factor that
ensures the node passes the decision boundary. We also clip
the new A′ to ensure stability, in a similar manner to the
handling of p in the preceding subsection.
The procedure for computing the minimum perturbation v
is summarized in Algorithm 2.
4. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate thoroughly the proposed attack
GUA, through investigation of its design details, comparison
with baselines, and validation of transferability from model
to model. Code is available at https://github.com/
chisam0217/Graph-Universal-Attack
4.1. Details
We compute the anchor set through attacking the standard
GCN model (Kipf & Welling, 2017). The parameters of
Algorithms 1 and 2 are: max epoch = 100, max iter =
Graph Universal Adversarial Attacks: A Few Bad Actors Ruin Graph Learning Models
Figure 4. Given a target node i, the Fc’s are decision boundaries
and the vc’s are the minimum perturbations that send i to each
decision boundary.
20, δ = 0.9, and overshoot = 0.02. We repeat experiments
ten times for each setting.
4.2. Datasets
We experiment with three commonly used node classifica-
tion benchmark datasets. Their information is summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1. Dataset Statistics. Only the largest connected component
(LCC) is considered.
DATASET NODES(LCC) EDGES(LCC) CLASSES
CORA 2708 5278 7
CITESEER 3327 4676 6
POL.BLOGS 1222 16714 2
• Cora: It is a citation network of machine learning pa-
pers. There are 140 nodes in the training set and 1000
nodes in the test set.
• Citeseer: It is also a citation network. There are 120
nodes in the training set and 1000 nodes in the test set.
• Pol.Blogs: It is a social network of political blogs.
There are 121 nodes in the training set and 1101 nodes
in the test set.
4.3. Baseline Methods
Because graph universal attacks were barely studied, we de-
sign three baseline methods for evaluating the effectiveness
of GUA. Additionally, we also compare with Fast Gradient
Attack (Chen et al., 2018), a per-node attack method. This
attack is not a universal attack; it modifies edges/non-edges
connecting to different nodes depending on the target.
Algorithm 2 Iterative Minimum Perturbation (IMP)
Input: adjacency matrixA, node index i, data overshoot
v ← 0
iter ← 0
pred← lˆ(A,X, i)
A′ ← A
while lˆ(A′, X, i) = pred do
for c 6= pred do
∆wc ← ∇f(A′, X)i,c −∇f(A′, X)i,pred
∆fc ← f(A′, X)i,c − f(A′, X)i,pred
end for
k ← arg minc6=pred |∆fc|||∆wc||2
∆v ← |∆fk|||∆wk||22 ∆wk
v ← v + ∆v
A′ ← g(A, i, (1 + overshoot)× v)
A′ ← A′.clip(0, 1)
iter ← iter + 1
end while
v ← (1 + overshoot)× v
return v, iter
• Global Random: Each node has a probability Prob to
become an anchor node. In other words, each element
of the attack vector p is an independent sample of
Bernoulli(Prob).
• Limited Random: We sample a prescribed number
of anchor nodes without replacement from the whole
graph.
• Victim-Class Attack: We sample a prescribed number
of anchor nodes without replacement from nodes of a
particular class. This baseline originates from a finding
that the anchor nodes computed by GUA often belong
to the same class. More details will come later.
• Fast Gradient Attack (FGA): This method flips the
connections between the target node and nodes with
the largest absolute gradient values. This baseline does
not perform universal attacks.
4.4. Results
The evaluation metric is attack success rate (ASR). Another
quantity of interest is the number of modified links (ML).
For universal attacks, it is equivalent to the anchor set size.
Importance of clipping. As discussed in the design of
GUA, the continuous relaxation of the attack vector p re-
quires clipping throughout optimization. For an empirical
supporting evidence, we show in Figure 5 the ASR obtained
through executing Algorithm 1 with and without clipping,
respectively. Clearly, clipping leads to stabler and superior
results. Without clipping, the ASR may drop to zero in
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some random trials. The reason is that several entries of
p become strongly negative, such that projections result in
small values for all positive entries and subsequent hard
thresholding zeros out the whole vector p.
Figure 5. ASR: using clipping versus not. Ten experiments are
repeated.
Effect of projection radius. We treat the L2-norm pro-
jection radius ξ as a parameter and study its relationship
with the ASR. See Table 2. As expected, the larger ξ the
more anchor nodes appear, because the projected vector p
likely contains more values greater than 0.5. A larger anchor
set also frequently results in higher ASR, because of more
changes to the graph.
Table 2. Average ML and average ASR under different projection
radius ξ.
DATASET ξ AVG. ML AVG. ASR(%)
CORA 3 4.4 75.60
4 7.9 84.21
5 10.8 83.56
CITESEER 3 3.3 63.67
4 7.7 77.07
5 13.9 80.01
POL.BLOGS 3 2.6 17.68
4 5.3 22.65
5 10 30.84
One sees from the table that attacks on Cora and Citeseer
are quite effective. In fact, the individual result for each trial
may suggest even more attractive findings. For example, for
the case of Cora and ξ = 4, the MLs for the ten trials are
{5, 9, 10, 7, 8, 9, 9, 9, 6, 7} and the corresponding ASRs
are {0.780, 0.875, 0.869, 0.850, 0.866, 0.880, 0.874, 0.813,
0.805, 0.809}. This result means that as few as six anchor
nodes are sufficient to achieve 80% ASR.
On the other hand, one also sees that the attacks on
Pol.Blogs are less effective. The reason is that the graph
has a large average degree, which makes it relatively robust
to universal attacks. As observed by Zu¨gner et al. (2018)
and Wu et al. (2019a), nodes with more neighbors are harder
to attack than those with fewer neighbors. The higher den-
sity of the graph requires a larger anchor set to achieve
higher ASR.
Blindly using more anchors does not work. Now that
we have a sophisticated method to compute the anchor
nodes, we investigate whether randomly chosen anchor
nodes are similarly effective. In Figure 6, we plot the ASR
results of the baseline Global Random. One sees that all
ASRs for Cora are below 40% and for Citeseer below 30%.
Such results are way inferior to those of the proposed GUA.
Moreover, using hundreds and even a thousand anchors does
not improve the ASR. The random method is not effective.
(a) Cora.
(b) Citeseer.
Figure 6. Performance of global random attack, repeated ten times.
Anchors often belong to the same class. With analysis
of the anchors, an interesting finding is that one class dom-
inates. In Figure 7, we plot the entropy of the class distri-
bution of the anchors for each random trial. One sees that
a majority of the entropies is zero, which indicates that in
these cases only one class appears.
Wrong classifications often coincide with the anchor
class. A natural conjecture following the above finding is
that a target node will be misclassified to the (majority) class
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Figure 7. Class distribution entropy of the anchor nodes. Ten ex-
periments are repeated.
of the anchors. Table 3 (on the data set Cora) corroborates
this conjecture. The table indicates that 96% of the test
nodes are misclassified to class 6 when all the anchor nodes
belong to this class. An analysis of the data set shows that
each node has two neighbors on average. Hence, flipping
the connections to the anchor nodes possibly makes the an-
chor class dominate among the new set of neighbors. Then,
classifying into the anchor class becomes more likely. This
result echoes one mentioned by Nandanwar & Murty (2016),
who conclude that classification of a node is strongly influ-
enced by the classes of its neighbors; it tends to coincide
with the majority class of the neighbors.
Table 3. Number of test nodes predicted into a certain class, when
the anchor nodes belong to class 6. Data set: Cora.
DATASET CLASS 6 OTHER CLASSES
# TEST NODES 959 41
To generalize the above result, in Table 4 we list the entropy
of the class distribution before and after attack. For all data
sets, the entropy decreases, indicating stronger dominance
of one class after attack. The decrease is more substantial
for Cora and Citeseer than for Pol.Blogs, which is expected,
because the latter has denser and more varied connections,
which eclipse the dominance of the anchor class.
Table 4. Class entropy before and after attack.
ENTROPY CORA CITESEER POL.BLOGS
BEFORE ATTACK 1.863 1.784 0.689
AFTER ATTACK 0.203 0.297 0.623
Comparison with baselines. We compare the proposed
GUA with four baseline methods explained in Section 4.3.
Since we cannot choose the number of anchor nodes for
GUA, we obtain this value based on the results in Table 1
when ξ = 4. In this case, the average ML for Cora, Citeseer,
and Pol.Blogs is respectively 7.9, 7.7, and 5.3. Therefore,
we set the number of anchor nodes for Limited Random
and Victim-Class Attack, as well as the average number of
anchor nodes for FGA, to be the ceiling of these values. For
Global Random, Prob is set such that the expected number
of anchor nodes is these values.
Table 5. Average ASR. For a fair comparison, all methods except
FGA use the same number of anchor nodes. FGA is not a universal
attack and we set the average number of modified links per node
to be the same as the number of anchor nodes.
ATTACK METHOD CORA CITESEER POL.BLOGS
GUA 84.21% 77.07% 22.65%
GLOBAL RANDOM 22.00% 26.58% 8.61%
LIMITED RANDOM 17.26% 29.95% 11.13%
VICTIM ATTACK 62.64% 54.47% 19.28%
FGA (NOT UNIV.) 89.70% 84.82% 59.80%
From Table 5, one sees that GUA significantly outperforms
other universal attack methods. Among them, Victim-Class
Attack is the most effective, but it is still inferior to GUA.
This result suggests that GUA leverages more information
(in this case, node features) than the class labels, although
we have seen strong evidences that anchor nodes computed
by GUA mostly belong to the same class.
From the table, one also sees that GUA is inferior to FGA
if only ASR is concerned. FGA is not a universal attack
method; it finds different anchors for each target node. Thus,
it is possible to optimize the number of anchors (possibly
different for each target) to aim at a certain ASR, or equiv-
alently, to achieve a better ASR given a certain number of
anchors. However, it is also because FGA is not a universal
attack, that the total number of anchor nodes for all targets
soars. For example, FGA modifies links with 1406 anchors
on Cora and 1359 anchors on Citeseer in total.
Effect of removing anchor nodes. Once a set of anchor
nodes is identified, a natural question asks if the set contains
redundancy. We perform the following experiment: we
randomly remove a number of anchor nodes and recompute
the ASR. Because on Cora and Citeseer, the average number
anchor nodes for ξ = 4 is 7.9 and 7.7 respectively, we use
an anchor set of size eight to conduct the experiment. For
each case, we randomly remove 1–7 nodes from the anchor
set and report the corresponding average ASR. The results
are shown in Figure 8.
From the figure, one sees that the average ASR gradually
decreases to zero as more and more anchor nodes are re-
moved. This result indicates that there exists no redundancy
in the anchor set. The decease is faster when more nodes
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Figure 8. Average ASR after deleting nodes from the anchor set.
are removed, but the average ASR is still quite high even
when removing half of the nodes. This finding is the second
evidence that supports the trade-off between anchor set size
and ASR, in additional to the prior Table 2.
Transferability. We have already seen that GUA is quite
effective in attacking GCN, based on the results obtained so
far. Such an attack belongs to the white-box family, because
knowledge of the model to be attacked is assumed. Such
knowledge includes the model form as well as the model
parameters. In reality, however, the model parameters may
not be known at all, not even the model form. Attacks under
this scenario is called black-box. One approach to conduct-
ing black-box attack is to use a surrogate model. In our case,
if one is interested in attacking graph deep learning models
other than GCN, GCN may serve as the surrogate. The
important question is whether anchors found by attacking
the surrogate can effectively attack other models as well.
Table 6. Average ASR after applying the anchor nodes found by
GUA when ξ = 4 on other node classification models.
METHODS CORA CITESEER
GCN 84.21% 77.07%
DEEPWALK 85.80% 81.71%
NODE2VEC 80.84% 74.07%
GAT 85.15% 77.02%
We perform an experiment with three such models: Deep-
Walk (Perozzi et al., 2014), node2vec (Grover & Leskovec,
2016), and GAT (Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017). The first two com-
pute, in an unsupervised manner, node embeddings that are
used for downstream classification, whereas the last one is
a graph neural network that directly performs classification.
In Table 6, we list the ASR for these models. One sees that
the ASRs are similarly high as that for GCN; sometimes
even surpass. This finding concludes that the results of GUA
are well transferable.
5. Related Work
Since the seminal work by Szegedy et al. (2014), various
types of methods have been proposed to generate adversarial
examples. For instance, Goodfellow et al. (2014) introduce
the fast gradient sign method and Carlini & Wagner (2017)
develop a powerful attack through iterative optimization.
This work is related to recent advances in adversarial attacks
on GNNs and general universal attacks.
Adversarial attack on GNN. Zu¨gner et al. (2018) pro-
pose NETTACK that uses a greedy mechanism to attack
the graph embedding model by changing the entry that
maximizes the loss change. Dai et al. (2018) introduce
a reinforcement learning based method that modifies the
graph structure and significantly lowers the test accuracy.
Wang et al. (2018) propose Greedy-GAN that poisons the
training nodes through adding fake nodes indistinguishable
by a discriminator. Chen et al. (2018) recursively compute
connection-based gradients and flip the connection value
based on the maximum gradient. Zu¨gner & Gu¨nnemann
(2019) use meta-gradients to solve a bi-level problem for-
mulated for training-time attacks.
Universal attack. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017) train a
quasi-imperceptible universal perturbation that successfully
attacks most of the images in the same dataset. Brown et al.
(2017) generate a small universal patch to misclassify any
image into any target class. Wu & Fu (2019) search for a
universal perturbation that can be well transferred to several
models.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we consider universal adversarial attacks on
graphs and propose the first algorithm, named GUA, to
effectively conduct these attacks. GUA finds a set of anchor
nodes to mislead the classification of all nodes in the graph
through flipping the connections between the anchors and
the target node. GUA achieves the highest ASR compared
to several universal attack baselines. There exists a trade-off
between ASR and the anchor set size and we find that a very
small size is sufficient to achieve remarkable attack success.
Additionally, we find that the computed anchor nodes often
belong to the same class. We also find that the anchor nodes
used to attack one model equally well attack other models.
In the future, we plan to develop defense mechanisms to
effectively counter these attacks.
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